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Abstract—The integrity and authenticity of the energy usage
data in Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) is crucial to
ensure the correct energy load to facilitate generation, distri-
bution and customer billing. Any malicious tampering to the
data must be detected immediately. This paper introduces secure
end-to-end data aggregation for AMI, a security protocol that
allows the concentrators to securely aggregate the data collected
from the smart meters, while enabling the utility back-end
that receives the aggregated data to verify the integrity and
data originality. Compromise of concentrators can be detected.
The aggregated data is protected using Chameleon Signatures
and then forwarded to the utility back-end for verification,
accounting, and analysis. Using the Trapdoor Chameleon Hash
Function, the smart meters can periodically send an evidence to
the utility back-end, by computing an alternative message and
a random value (𝑚′, 𝑟) such that 𝑚′ consists of all previous
energy usage measurements of the smart meter in a specified
period of time. By verifying that the Chameleon Hash Value
of (𝑚′, 𝑟) and that the energy usage matches those aggregated
by the concentrators, the utility back-end is convinced of the
integrity and authenticity of the data from the smart meters. Any
data anomaly between smart meters and concentrators can be
detected, thus indicating potential compromise of concentrators.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the increasing number of devices being deployed
nowadays, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of the infor-
mation source has become very challenging [11], [13], [18].
Deploying smart meters with two-way communications capa-
bility enables energy usage data to be read more frequently
e.g., every thirty minutes, and it also allows for the utility
companies to push energy prices to the consumer dynamically.
Consumers can therefore monitor their energy usage, and plan
their energy use according to the price plan in order to save
cost. For the utility companies, they can better manage the
energy load in terms of power generation, distribution, billing
and outage detection through analysis of energy usage data
collected through the AMI.
Smart meters are deployed into each household, to measure
energy use of electrical appliances that form a Home Area
Network (HAN). A Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) [2]
is a wireless mesh network that interconnects a group of
smart meters with a concentrator, so that the collected energy
usage data can then be aggregated before they are forwarded
to the Utility Data Management Centre through a WAN
interface. In some deployment, the smart meters may have
a communication channel with the utility server via 3G or
GPRS without needing the concentrator. However, such a
communication topology is costly though data aggregation are
not required in this case.
Energy data aggregation poses a challenging security
risk [12] as the concentrator will usually have access to the
energy data obtained from the smart meters, before it performs
data aggregation. This means that the concentrator is a single
point of failure, and if it is compromised, the attackers will be
able to manipulate and tamper with the energy data. In fact,
providing end-to-end security between the two end-points,
i.e., between the smart meters and the utility data centre,
is costly mainly because this can only be provided at the
transport or application layer and both end-points are required
to establish shared cryptographic keying materials to protect
the communication channel end-to-end. The data integrity
and the authenticity of the source are not only important for
analysis, they are also useful for intrusion detection system.
In June 2010, a powerful worm named Stuxnet [17], [1]
was uncovered and was known to be able to cripple numerous
critical infrastructures including many industrial control sys-
tems (ICS). Stuxnet exploited the vulnerability of an ICS to
compromise the logic controllers. After taking control of the
field devices, the compromised logic controller continues to
fake “normal” field device readings to be sent to the central
controller, thus ensuring that the device compromise remains
undetected. As field devices do not protect its messages end-to-
end, but rely on the logic controller to aggregate the readings,
tampering of data can be conducted easily. If end-to-end secu-
rity were provided, the logic controller would not have access
to the data, and at the same time, the speed of detecting device
compromise would be much faster and recovery actions could
be triggered earlier. Similar attacks could be launched against
AMI [21] by attacking the concentrators in the network, and
such an attack can equally be used to paralyze the smart grid
power generation and distribution network.
This paper proposes a scheme to provide secure data ag-
gregation through delayed-integrity-verification for any appli-
cation architecture that is based on wireless meshing such as
AMI while preserving the efficiency of a distributed architec-
ture. Devices continue to be organized in a hierarchical man-
ner, consisting of smart meters, reporting energy usage data
periodically to the concentrator that serves as data aggregator
before the data are forwarded further to the utility back-end.
The smart meters periodically generate a chameleon message
hash based on the previously reported usage data, to allow for
the utility back-end to verify the data’s integrity and authen-
ticity, and to perform check on whether the concentrators have
tampered with the energy data. Any tampering to the energy
data can be detected by the utility back-end and an alarm can
be triggered to act on the misbehaving concentrators.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II provides some
background and discusses related work. Section III presents
the attacker models and security requirements. Section IV
outlines the steps in providing delayed-integrity-verification
to achieve end-to-end integrity and authenticity verification.
Section V presents a security analysis of the proposed scheme
and Section VI concludes the paper with future work.
II. RELATED WORK
This section provides background on Chameleon Signa-
tures [15], [14], and related work on data aggregation.
A. Chameleon Hashing
Chameleon Hashing was introduced by Brassard and
Chaum [6]. It has the same properties as the normal hash
function except that it has a trapdoor in built for finding
collisions. Without the knowledge of the trapdoor, it works
as a collision resistant functions on which a regular signature
function can be applied to provide authenticity and integrity to
the message. Chameleon Hashing is associated with a pair of
public and private keys in which the private key serves as the
trapdoor for the hash function. It is collision resistant in that
without the knowledge of the trapdoor, it is infeasible to find
two inputs when hashed are mapped to the same hash value.
The distinct capability of Chameleon Hashing is that it allows
the owner of the trapdoor to change the input to the function
without changing the output.
B. Chameleon Signatures
Chameleon Signature [15], [14] was introduced as a much
simpler implementation of undeniable signatures [8], [7]. It is
built similar to the traditional digital signature scheme that is
hash-then-sign approach. A regular digital signature scheme
such as RSA, DSS or ECC is applied to a special type of
hashing called chameleon hash functions [6] as described in
Section II-A.
The Chameleon Signature scheme allows a Signer, 𝑆 to sign
a message to be sent to a Recipient, 𝑅 such that it gives 𝑅 the
ability to forge further signatures of 𝑆 at will. Consequently,
when presenting the signature to a third party, it is not possible
to prove the validity of the signature because 𝑅 could have
produced such a signature by himself. However, this scheme
is useful in that it provides the signer 𝑆 with the exclusive
ability to prove that a forged signature is in fact a forgery.
The signer only needs to provide a short piece of information
as evidence for the forgery, i.e., the original message in which
when hashed produces the equivalent hash value as claimed
in the forged signature.
Although this scheme is conceptually simpler and more
efficient in that it is non-interactive, it appears that its ap-
plication is somewhat restricted. In this paper, we adapted the
use of Chameleon Signatures to enable secure data aggregation
in a typical wireless mesh network where data produced by
multiple sources are aggregated by a third entity before they
are forwarded to the final Recipient for analysis.
C. Sanitizable Signatures and Transitive Signatures
Sanitizable signature [3] was introduced to allow a signer
to partly delegate signing rights to a semi-trusted party called
a sanitizer, so that it is allowed to change a pre-determined
part of the signed document. This is particularly useful for
applications such as authenticated multicast, and authenti-
cated database outsourcing because multicast messages can
be customized by a trusted sanitizer without compromising
the integrity and authenticity of the messages from the source.
However, this scheme has a strong assumption that the san-
itizer is semi-trusted, and it is difficult to detect dishonest
sanitization in this scheme.
Transitive signatures [19], [4] and aggregate signatures [5]
provide a mechanism to transform and aggregate multiple
signatures into one respectively. Thus allowing for the veri-
fication of the authenticity and integrity of the messages from
its original sources. With aggregate signature, 𝑛 signatures on
𝑛 distinct messages from 𝑛 distinct users can be aggregated
into a single short signature. This single signature (and the 𝑛
original messages) will convince the verifier that the 𝑛 users
did indeed sign the 𝑛 original messages [5]. However, using
such schemes would incur additional communication overhead
as each source must compute a digital signature for each
message it transmits before they are aggregated.
D. Privacy-Preserved Data Aggregation
Danezis et. al. [9] proposed an aggregation scheme based on
secret-sharing and secure multi-party computation techniques.
Meter readings are jointly processed by a public storage ser-
vice and other independent authorities, each owing an additive
share of the readings. Other privacy-friendly data aggregation
schemes include [16], [10], [20], they are efficient in that the
meters generate readings that are blinded by additive shares
summing to zero. When the blinded readings are revealed and
summed, the sum of the readings is obtained.
However, most of the privacy-preserved data aggregation
scheme assumes that the smart meters and the concentrators
are trustworthy. In this paper, we emphasize on the authenticity
and integrity of the smart meter readings, ensuring that no
one has tampered with the readings during the transmission.
Therefore, guaranteeing the provenance and data integrity can
be seen as a step prior to privacy preservation of the meter
readings.
III. SECURITY THREATS AND REQUIREMENTS
A. Attacker Model
This section describes three main security attacks on an
AMI. In this paper, we do not consider physical jamming
attacks and distributed denial-of-service attacks.
1) Eavesdropping on Communication Channel: Attackers
can eavesdrop on the communication channel between the
smart meter and the concentrator, as well as the channel
between the concentrator and the utility back-end to obtain
meter readings, commands and aggregated energy usage data.
2) Man-in-the-Middle Attack: The concentrator is regarded
as the MITM as it sits between the smart meter and the utility
back-end. Attackers can compromise the concentrator in order
to tamper with the data, and selectively report data to the utility
back-end. In a more generalized form, the communication
is vulnerable to MITM attacks when attackers are sitting in
between any of the AMI entities.
3) Compromise of Concentrator: This results in the ability
of the concentrators to fully manipulate the smart meters, e.g.,
remote disconnect the electricity and reports fraudulent data
to the utility back-end to enable theft of electricity. Attackers
are motivated to hack the concentrators, e.g., to tamper with
the aggregated data and manipulate the energy data of many
households.
B. Security Requirements
Based on the smart grid and AMI communication architec-
ture, we derive three main security requirements as follows:
1) Data Integrity: The energy data used by each household
must be integrity protected to prevent energy theft. Any
tampering of the data during transmission to the utility back-
end would not be acceptable. The accuracy of the energy data
must reflect the current energy load, and it is important to
balance the energy demand and response.
2) Data Origin Authentication: The data origin of the
measurement is important to ensure that it was taken using a
designated device. This enables the utility back-end to securely
map the energy usage data to a smart meter. Such a guarantee
is crucial to enable the utility to remotely determine the
status of smart meters and concentrators, e.g., performing fault
diagnostic to identify the faulty or misbehaving concentrators
and smart meters in the AMI.
3) Secure Data Aggregation: As most of the data are being
aggregated by the concentrators, this means that the original
data have been transformed. Although this poses difficulty
in ensuring the data integrity and data originality, a very
important security requirement is to ensure that the utility
back-end that receives the transformed or aggregated data must
have the ability to check the integrity and source authenticity.
In addition, an AMI should be able to detect any unauthorized
data modification by the concentrators, application hosting
devices, or any other intermediaries, so that any incidents of
intrusion can be detected and acted upon swiftly.
IV. SECURE E2E DATA AGGREGATION
This section introduces an approach to end-to-end data
aggregation for AMI. It allows the concentrators to securely
aggregate data collected from smart meters, while enabling the
utility back-end that receives the aggregated data to verify the
data origin and its integrity.
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Fig. 1. Data flow in an Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
A. Data Flow in AMI
Fig. 1 illustrates the data flow in AMI. Smart meters periodi-
cally send energy usage data to the concentrator. Energy usage
data from multiple sources are aggregated by the concentrator
in order to minimize bandwidth consumption and reduce the
number of messages to be transmitted, therefore improve
efficiency. The aggregated data are forwarded to the utility
back-end for analysis. Typically, two secure communication
channels are needed to protect the authenticity and integrity
of the data. Between the concentrators and the utility back-
end, digital signature is used to provide authenticity and data
integrity. If encryption is needed, a TLS channel can be
established between the concentrators and the utility back-end.
It is possible that there are additional intermediaries between
the concentrators and the utility back-end such as routers,
gateways, etc. However, their roles are restricted to routing
and forwarding of the protected data to the central controller.
Between the smart meters and the concentrators, a symmetric-
key communication channel can be used to protect information
between the two parties.
B. Setup, Operation and Verification
The proposed solution is based on Chameleon Hashing [6]
and Chameleon Signatures [15], [14] in that it allows for the
concentrators to aggregate the data, compute a chameleon hash
value (𝐶𝐻𝑉 ) of the aggregated data, and then sign it using a
traditional digital signature. The aggregated data together with
the signature are sent to the utility back-end, thus establishing
the authenticity of the data from the concentrators. The smart
meters which know the trapdoor function of the Chameleon
Hash Function can periodically compute a different message,
𝑚′𝑖 and a random value 𝑟𝑖, given the 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐 computed by
the concentrator, where 𝑚′𝑖 consists of all the previous energy
usage data logged by the smart meter, 𝑠𝑚𝑖 within a time
period. The combination of (𝑚′𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) are then forwarded to the
utility back-end for verification. It serves as an evident to prove
that the recorded energy usage data are truly originated from
the smart meter itself. This data could either be routed via the
concentrators or via an alternative communication channel if it
exists, e.g., a GRPS/3G connectivity between the smart meter
and the utility back-end. The utility back-end is then convinced
of the integrity of the energy usage data and its data origin
because (𝑚′𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) when hashed, the resulting chameleon hash
value is equivalent to the 𝐶𝐻𝑉 sent by the concentrators, and
that the recorded energy usage values match the corresponding
values previously sent by the concentrators. Such a property
proves that the concentrators have not been compromised.
C. Commissioning
Prior to deployment, all smart meters and concentrators
must be commissioned with the relevant cryptographic keying
materials. As illustrated in Fig. 2, when the AMI is first
deployed with smart meters 𝑠𝑚, the meters are grouped
together and then bound to a concentrator. Each group of smart
meters is then commissioned with a Trapdoor Chameleon
Hash Function, where they share the trapdoor key, 𝐾 ′ among
themselves, while the responsible concentrator is configured
with the corresponding Chameleon Hash Function which has
the public key, 𝐾. This public-key held by the concentrator is
also known to the utility back-end. Such a configuration allows
both the concentrator and the utility back-end to compute
a Chameleon Hash 𝐶𝐻𝑉 given a message, while only the
smart meters have the ability to produce the same 𝐶𝐻𝑉
with a different message. Apart from the smart meters in the
group, no other entity in the system should know the Trapdoor
Chameleon Hash Function and its trapdoor key 𝐾 ′.
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Fig. 2. Commissioning of cryptographic keying materials
Each smart meter is also provisioned with a unique sym-
metric key, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚 for identification purposes. This is done
as part of the manufacturing process, and the utility back-end
has knowledge of this key so that secure communication can
be established to facilitate firmware update, dissemination of
energy tariffs, updating of device configuration, etc.
It is also assumed that there is a secure channel between the
concentrator with each smart meter it manages. A symmetric-
key encryption scheme, e.g., DTLS is used to protect the
confidentiality and integrity of the data transmitted. This
is essential as the wireless communication is vulnerable to
passive eavesdropping, packet injection and tampering.
The concentrator typically has more computational capabil-
ity and resources, therefore a digital signature scheme can be
deploy to protect the aggregated data to be sent to the utility
back-end. With this, each concentrator is also commissioned
with a public-private keypair, and it can be used to sign the
aggregated data using its private key. The utility back-end has
knowledge of all the public-keys of all concentrators under its
jurisdiction, so that signatures can be verified.
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Fig. 3. Overview of secure E2E data aggregation with delayed-integrity-
verification
D. Operations
Fig. 3 shows the cryptographic operations to be performed
by the concentrators and the smart meters to ensure the
integrity and authenticity of the data. The details of each
operation are described in the following sections.
1) Transmission of Energy Usage Data: For a group of
smart meters 𝑠𝑚1, 𝑠𝑚2, 𝑠𝑚3,..., 𝑠𝑚𝑛 where 𝑛 is the number
of meters bound to a concentrator, 𝑐𝑐, each smart meter
periodically reports energy usage data to the concentrator for
aggregation. The usage data is encrypted with each smart
meter’s respective secret-key shared with the concentrator.
For example, 𝑠𝑚𝑖 sends 𝑚𝑖,𝑗 to the concentrator, where 𝑖
is the device identifier, and 𝑗 is the message number. This
message can be protected using DTLS Record Layer, thus
providing message freshness guarantee and detecting message
replay.
Operation: Transmit Data
𝑠𝑚𝑖 → 𝑐𝑐: {𝑠𝑚𝑖, 𝑚𝑖,𝑗}
2) Data Aggregation: When the concentrator, 𝑐𝑐 receives
data from multiple smart meters it manages, it is responsible
for aggregating the data received before forwarding them to
the utility back-end. The concentrator collects 𝑛 messages
from the smart meters periodically, i.e., 𝑚1,𝑗 , 𝑚2,𝑗 ,..., 𝑚𝑛,𝑗
where 𝑛 is the number of smart meters, and 𝑗 is the message
number.
Operation: Aggregate Data
𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑘: {𝑚1,𝑗 , 𝑚2,𝑗 ,..., 𝑚𝑛,𝑗}
where 𝑘 is the aggregated message identifier and 𝑘 > 0
The aggregated data is hashed and then signed using
the concentrator’s Chameleon Hash Function and private key
respectively.
Operation: Hash and Sign Aggregated Data
𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑘 = CHA HASH(𝐾𝑐𝑐, {𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑘})
𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑘 = SIGN(𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑣𝑐𝑐, 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑘)
where CHA HASH is a Chameleon Hash Function.
Finally, the aggregated data, and the signature are sent to
the utility for verification. At the same time, the Chameleon
Hash Value, i.e., 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑘 is broadcast to all the smart meters
managed by the concentrator as a means to acknowledge
receipt of the data transmitted by the smart meters.
Operation: Transmit to Utility
𝑐𝑐 → utility: 𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑘, {𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑘}
𝑐𝑐 → 𝑠𝑚1,2,...,𝑛: 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑘
3) Verification: Upon receipt of the aggregated data and
signature from the concentrator, the utility back-end verifies
the digital signature using the concentrator’s public-key.
During the signature verification process, the utility back-end
uses the concentrator’s Chameleon Hash Function to compute
the 𝐶𝐻𝑉 . If the verification is successful, it accepts the
integrity and authenticity of the data received, and stores the
𝐶𝐻𝑉 and the 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 for end-to-end verification later on.
Operation: Verify Signature
VERIFY(𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑐𝑐, 𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑘, 𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑀𝑆𝐺𝑐𝑐,𝑘)
E. Periodic End-to-End Verification
Since the signature is generated by the concentrators, the
utility back-end can only believe that the data are originated
from the concentrators and have not been tampered with
during transmission. However, there is no guarantee that the
concentrators have not been compromised and tampered with
the readings before aggregating them. Therefore, in order to
ensure that the concentrators have not been attacked, and the
reported data are truly originated from the smart meters (with
the assumption that the smart meters are trusted1), the delayed-
integrity-verification scheme as described in this section must
be enabled.
1) Transmission of Evidence: The delayed-integrity-
verification scheme divides transmission time into multiple
fixed length period, where each period consists of 𝑡 intervals.
This allows the smart meters to send up to 𝑡 messages to
the concentrator in a period. As mentioned previously, for
each message that the smart meter had sent, it receives
an Acknowledgement that contain a 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑖 from the
concentrator, where 𝑖 is the interval and 𝑐𝑐 denotes the
identifier of the concentrator. At the end of each time period,
each smart meter uses any of the received Chameleon Hash
Value within the period, e.g., 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣 where 1 ≤ 𝑣 ≤ 𝑡 and
the corresponding Trapdoor Chameleon Hash Function to
compute a value, 𝑟𝑖 such that the concatenation of its device
key with all the respective data they had sent for that period,
{𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖, 𝑚𝑖,1, 𝑚𝑖,2,..., 𝑚𝑖,𝑡} when hashed together with
𝑟𝑖 is equivalent 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣. All smart meters that are bound
to the same concentrator use the same Trapdoor Chameleon
Hash Function.
1Collusion between smart meters and concentrators are beyond the scope
of this paper. This is because if the information source, i.e., the smart meter
is dishonest, it is extremely hard to guarantee the authenticity and originality
of the energy usage data.
Operation: Each smart meter, 𝑠𝑚𝑖 computes 𝑟𝑖
𝑟𝑖 = TC HASH(𝐾 ′, {{𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖, 𝑚𝑖,1,..., 𝑚𝑖,𝑡}, 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣})
where
𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣 = CHA HASH(𝐾, {𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖, 𝑚𝑖,1,..., 𝑚𝑖,𝑡}, 𝑟𝑖)
Since only the smart meters know the Trapdoor Chameleon
Hash Function, no other entity can produce a different (𝑚′,
𝑟′) when hashed, is equivalent to 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣. All the (𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑖)
are then forwarded to the utility back-end. The Smart Meter’s
unique device key, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖 is also concatenated with the
energy data for identification purpose. The smart meter is only
required to perform the Trapdoor Chameleon Hash operation,
without needing to generate any signatures. The reported
(𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) are used as evidences to detect any malicious actions
performed by the concentrator. The 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖 ensures that
no one can impersonate the smart meter, while the (𝑚𝑖,
𝑟𝑖) if corresponds to the energy data previously reported
by the concentrators ensures data consistency, and that the
concentrators have not been compromised. Even though the
evidence is routed via the concentrators, if it was dropped,
the utility back-end would be able to detect this easily and
suspect misbehaviour of the concentrator.
Operation: Report to Utility
𝑠𝑚𝑖 → 𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦: 𝑠𝑚𝑖, ({𝑚𝑖,1,..., 𝑚𝑖,𝑡}, 𝑟𝑖)
2) Delayed-Integrity-Verification: The utility back-end
stores all the data received from the concentrators, including
the aggregated data (𝐴𝑔𝑔𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎), as well as all the Chameleon
Hash Values (CHVs). When it receives (𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) from each
smart meter, it can verify the integrity and authenticity of the
messages by computing a Chameleon Hash Value of (𝑚𝑖, 𝑟𝑖),
𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦. If the 𝐶𝐻𝐾𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦 is equivalent to any of the
received 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣 from the concentrator managing the smart
meters, then it also accepts the signature.
Operation: Verify end-to-end security
CHV VERIFY(𝐾𝑐𝑐, {𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖, 𝑚𝑖,1,..., 𝑚𝑖,𝑡}, 𝑟𝑖)
The utility back-end also checks each individual message
whether it matches the data previously signed by the concen-
trator. A match in terms of message values, and the number
of reported data indicates that both the concentrator and the
smart meter are in agreement and that the data have not
been tampered with. The utility back-end believes that the
data originated from the smart meters, thus achieving truly
end-to-end security between the smart meters and the utility
back-end. If there’s an anomaly in terms of message values,
the concentrator is suspected to be faulty or compromised.
In addition, a mismatch in terms of number of reported data
implies that the concentrator selectively dropped the data (with
the assumption that the channel between the concentrator
and the utility back-end is reliable, and the smart meters
are assumed to be trusted). Consequently, attacks on the
concentrators can be detected swiftly through this scheme.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
A. Data Integrity
The integrity of energy usage data is guaranteed by the
secure channels in the AMI. Assuming that the DTLS channel
between the smart meter and the concentrator is secure, it
is sufficient that the integrity of the data transmitted in the
channel is securely protected. Likewise, a reliable secure chan-
nel, i.e., TLS between the concentrators and the utility back-
end guarantees that the aggregated data is integrity protected.
This TLS channel is reliable in that all the data transmitted
is received by the utility back-end, so that billing can be
performed correctly.
B. Data Origin Authentication
The device key, 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚𝑖 as shown in Fig. 3 guarantees
that the data is originated from the smart meter 𝑠𝑚𝑖, since 𝑠𝑚𝑖
is the only entity which shares the device (secret) key with
the utility back-end. When the smart meter performs delayed-
integrity-verification protocol by sending (𝑚′𝑖, 𝑟𝑖) to the utility
back-end, this message is concatenated with 𝑆𝑒𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑠𝑚,𝑖 which
can only be produced by the smart meter itself.
C. Secure Data Aggregation
Assuming our chameleon digital signature is built by ap-
plying a regular unforgeable digital signature such as RSA
(or DSS, ECC) to a discrete logarithm based hashing (Fig.
1 in [15]). We claim that the proposed delayed-integrity-
verification scheme achieves end-to-end data integrity.
It suffices to prove that unforgeability of the proposed
scheme: no third party can provide a different (𝑚′, 𝑟′) when
hashed, is equivalent to 𝐶𝐻𝑉𝑐𝑐,𝑣. In order to forge such a
different (𝑚′, 𝑟′), a third party needs to break the under-
lying digital signature scheme, or to find collision in the
chameleon hashing. Breaking the underlying digital signature
scheme contradicts with the unforgeability of the underlying
digital signature, while finding collision in the chameleon
hashing implies computing the secret Trapdoor Chameleon
Hash Function and thus contradicts with the definition of
chameleon hashing. Henceforth, the proposed scheme achieves
end-to-end data integrity.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have provided a novel use of Chameleon Signatures
other than its traditional usage, to detect misbehavior of
concentrators in AMI. Using the delayed-integrity-verification
scheme, we can ensure that the data aggregated by the
concentrator is protected end-to-end in that the integrity,
authenticity and data originality of the energy usage data can
be guaranteed. This would be beneficial to the protection of
critical infrastructures. The advantage of this scheme is that
the digital signatures generated by the concentrators can be
used to verify both the data reported by the smart meters
and the concentrators themselves. The smart meters are not
required to use any public-key based signature scheme, but
merely executing a (Chameleon) hash operation.
We have also provided a security analysis to first show the
feasibility and robustness of the delayed-integrity-verification
scheme. The natural next step is to simulate and implement it
in an AMI test bed to assess the performance of the protocol.
Another future direction is to integrate the protocol with an
intrusion detection system. Machine learning techniques can
be used to detect any anomaly in the meter readings.
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